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This paper provides an overview of the complex conceptual and practical challenges that 
emerging market economies face as they attempt to reform their frameworks for financial 
regulation. These economies are striving to balance the quest for financial stability with the 
imperatives of financial development and broader financial inclusion. I argue that these 
objectives can in fact reinforce one another. I also discuss aspects of macroeconomic 
policies and cross-border regulation that have implications for financial stability and the 
resilience of the financial sector in emerging markets. 
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* This paper is the overview chapter for a forthcoming book on Financial Sector Reforms and 
Regulation in Emerging Markets, eds. Masahiro Kawai and Eswar Prasad, Brookings Institution Press, 
2010. I am grateful to Parul Sharma for her comments.   1 
I. Introduction 
 
The speed and breadth of contagion from the U.S. financial crisis have dramatically 
demonstrated the degree to which national economies, developed and developing alike, 
are intertwined. Initially a problem confined to the U.S. housing market, the rapid 
spillover of the crisis to the rest of the U.S. financial system and then to the global 
economy left financial institutions in other advanced economies reeling. The crisis has 
generated momentum on substantive regulatory reforms geared toward ensuring the 
integrity and resilience of financial systems in the advanced economies. 
 
The macroeconomic consequences of the crisis have also affected emerging markets and 
other developing economies, even though this group has rebounded more quickly and 
sharply from the crisis (see Kose and Prasad, 2010). These shared ramifications have 
brought into even sharper relief the centrality of sound financial systems for emerging 
markets as well as low-income developing economies. Efficient and stable financial 
systems are essential for both emerging markets and low-income developing economies 
to achieve long-term balanced development and to absorb various types of shocks. 
 
It is striking that the crisis emanated from the United States and hit particularly hard a 
group of economies, including that of the United Kingdom, that were once believed to 
have the most sophisticated and robust financial systems. These developments have led to 
a reevaluation of basic principles of financial regulation. Clearly, a reconfiguration and 
strengthening of existing regulatory models and frameworks would improve financial 
stability. The necessary paradigms are still evolving although there appears to be a 
general consensus on some key principles that will be central to a major redesign of 
financial regulation.  
 
Emerging market financial systems, including those in Asia, generally have proven to be 
more robust and less affected by the global turmoil compared to their advanced economy 
counterparts. It will be important to carefully filter out the right lessons from this 
outcome. Meanwhile, the imperative of financial development remains as strong as ever   2 
in emerging markets although the focus is more on basic elements, such as strengthening 
banking systems and widening the scope of the formal financial system, rather than on 
creating sophisticated instruments and innovations.  
 
Emerging markets face particular challenges in stabilizing their nascent financial systems 
in the face of shocks, both domestic and external. These challenges occur at a basic level 
in emerging markets, many of which are at the point of creating sound banking systems, 
widening inclusion in the formal financial system, and creating and managing a broader 
set of financial markets (such as corporate bond markets and basic currency derivatives). 
Thus the regulatory challenges in these economies are more about risks emanating from 
underdeveloped financial systems rather than risks from sophisticated financial 
innovations.  
 
New paradigms for financial development and regulation will have to be suitably 
reframed for emerging markets, which have a number of varying institutional and 
capacity constraints. Regulation in low-income countries, where the breadth of formal 
financial systems is severely limited, poses an even greater set of conceptual and practical 
challenges.  
 
Policymakers in emerging markets will need to grapple with a distinct set of issues once 
the recovery in the global economy is entrenched and attention can turn to the steps 
needed to restore financial stability. The following are some of the key issues facing 
policymakers and regulators in emerging markets:  
 
—What lessons does the crisis offer for the establishment of efficient and flexible 
regulatory structures? Even the advanced economies have had to confront these deep 
structural questions, which tend to be more complex in emerging markets due to 
inadequate regulatory capacity and weak legal and public institutions. 
—How can the regulatory and financial development agendas be reconciled in a 
manner that creates regulatory space for the introduction of standardized products and the 
development of broader financial markets while effectively managing the associated   3 
risks? The financial development agenda is an important one in emerging markets where 
efficient financial intermediation remains a major challenge, with implications for 
general economic welfare.  
—Is broader financial inclusion consistent with financial stability? In general, 
increasing financial inclusion—extending access to the formal financial system to a 
greater swath of the population—is a key issue for emerging markets at this critical 
juncture. Financial inclusion has many implications for allowing households to save and 
diversify their sources of income, enabling entrepreneurs to have access to financing, and 
creating a more efficient system of intermediating domestic savings into investment. 
—What avenues should be pursued to enable effective regulation of financial 
institutions with large operations in multiple countries? Foreign banks and other financial 
institutions have become key players in many emerging markets and have provided a 
number of direct and indirect benefits to local financial systems. However, in times of 
externally induced crises, they may prove to be a source of contagion. 
 
This essay focuses on evaluating the lessons from the crisis and on designing effective 
strategies for maintaining the momentum of financial development and inclusion in 
emerging markets, with a particular focus on Asian emerging markets. It attempts to 
assess the implications of the financial crisis for the design of regulatory frameworks and 
models, taking into account the specific constraints in emerging markets. The main areas 
covered in this paper are: 
 
—Basic principles of financial regulation: synthesizing evolving paradigms on the 
key characteristics of optimal regulatory structures to promote financial stability.  
—Financial regulatory reforms in emerging markets, with a focus on emerging 
Asia: dealing with the challenges of limited institutional development and regulatory 
capacity.  
—The financial development agenda: improving financial intermediation and 
creating space for the development of broader financial markets, including basic 
derivative products.    4 
—Financial inclusion: how to increase the access of households and entrepreneurs 
to the formal financial system in emerging markets and considerations of whether greater 
inclusion is consistent with promoting sound regulation.  
—Optimal macroeconomic policy frameworks to enhance financial stability: 
challenges in designing robust monetary policy frameworks, particularly in light of de 
facto increasingly open capital accounts.  
—Cross-border financial regulation and, more broadly, regulation of financial 
institutions that have a substantial presence in emerging markets.  
 
II. Basic Principles of Financial Regulation 
 
Before the financial crisis, the debate about optimal regulatory structures was focused 
narrowly on a few issues. One aspect of the debate was whether the United Kingdom’s 
single regulator model, as embodied in the Financial Services Authority, was better than 
the multiple regulator framework of the United States, where different agencies have 
varying jurisdictions. The crisis exposed gaping weaknesses in both models. The 
Financial Services Authority was responsible for overall financial stability but appears to 
have regulated with a “light touch,” allowing large levels of systemic risk to build up in 
the system. In the United States, regulatory failures were compounded by gaps in the 
overall framework for supervision and regulation that left some products and markets 
relatively unregulated and created large opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.  
 
A different angle to this issue is the contrast between rules-based and principles-based 
regulation. Rules-based regulation, which emphasizes getting the regulated to obey the 
letter of the regulation, typically involves more direct control by the regulatory authority 
and has been the preferred mode in emerging markets. It had been argued that principles-
based regulation, which emphasizes getting the regulated to adhere to the spirit of the 
regulation, is more appropriate for advanced financial markets. But it also may be 
relevant for emerging markets looking to develop their financial markets by opening 
them up to more innovation and risk taking. The crisis has shown that both approaches,   5 
which tend to be based on microprudential regulation of individual financial institutions, 
may be insufficient for dealing with systemic risk.  
 
A reconsideration of basic principles is needed for designing an effective and flexible 
regulatory mechanism that is capable of dealing with financial innovations and systemic 
risks. In the wake of the financial crisis, a number of reports have been commissioned 
from various bodies to look into regulatory reforms. These reports generally agree on 
some core principles that will have to be emphasized in any set of reforms.
1  
 
Higher Capital Requirements  
One clear impact of the crisis is the consensus that has developed on the need to increase 
the levels of capital held by financial institutions. The U.S. Treasury has enunciated a set 
of core principles for capital and liquidity requirements for financial institutions, 
including the following three principles:  
 
—Capital requirements should be designed to protect the stability of the financial 
system, not just the solvency of individual banking firms.  
—Capital requirements for all banks should be increased from present levels and 
should be even higher for financial firms that pose a threat to overall financial stability.  
—Banking firms should be subject to a simple, non-risk-based leverage constraint 
and also to a conservative, explicit liquidity standard.
2  
 
Along these lines, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has just recently 
proposed tighter capital requirements for banks, including higher levels of Tier 1 capital, 
                                                 
1. In the discussion in this section, I mainly draw upon the following reports: the Report of the 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (de Larosière Group 2009), the Group of 
Thirty report on financial sector reforms (Group of Thirty 2009), The Turner Review from the 
United Kingdom (Financial Services Authority 2009), the report on “Enhancing Sound 
Regulation and Strengthening Financial Transparency” (G-20 Working Group 1 2009), the report 
on “Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets” (G-20 
Working Group 2 2009), and the U.S. Treasury white paper on financial regulatory reform (U.S. 
Treasury 2009). Other relevant reports and papers are listed in “Additional Sources” at the end of 
this chapter.  
2. U.S. Treasury (2009).   6 
a higher ratio of core Tier 1 capital, a capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical 
capital buffer.
3 These regulatory requirements are to be phased in over a number of years 
although it is likely that markets will begin to evaluate banking institutions’ financial 
viability against these tougher standards sooner than that. Higher capital ratios and 
higher-quality forms of capital that enable banking firms to absorb losses and continue as 
going concerns in the face of adverse financial and macroeconomic shocks should 
provide for a more effective first line of defense for those institutions and limit systemic 
spillovers.  
 
The Treasury report cautions that stricter capital and liquidity requirements for the 
banking system should not be allowed to result in the reemergence of an under-regulated 
nonbank financial sector that poses a threat to financial stability. Determining appropriate 
capital adequacy standards for the shadow banking system will indeed be a key challenge 
in an effective redesign of the regulatory system. A related challenge is to ensure that 
tighter capital standards for banks and other highly regulated entities do not result in their 
simply shifting activity to less regulated areas, including off-balance-sheet activities such 
as structured investment vehicles. This would simply encourage more risk taking and 
raise systemic risk as well since many off-balance-sheet activities could end up being 
effectively on-balance sheet at times of crises. 
 
Countercyclical Provisioning and Acyclical Accounting Standards  
In addition to higher capital requirements, the nature of capital requirements will have to 
be reevaluated to ensure that they do not intensify systemic financial distress. Existing 
risk-weighted capital requirements can sometimes exacerbate financial panics by 
requiring financial institutions to raise capital by selling assets into falling markets.
4 The 
                                                 
3. For more details, see the documents posted at the Committee’s website: 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm 
4. Brunnermeier and others (2009) contend that countercyclical capital charges are essential and 
avoid inefficiencies related to higher capital requirements. They argue that regulators should 
adjust capital adequacy requirements over the cycle by two multiples:  the first related to above 
average growth of credit expansion and leverage, the second related to the mismatch in the 
maturity of assets and liabilities. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) suggest the creation of 
contingent capital that could be infused into an institution when it is in distress and facing higher 
capital needs. This contingent capital could take the form of debt issued by banks that could be   7 
alternative of a countercyclical capital requirement, however, creates complications in 
terms of defining and measuring the business cycle. Even in relatively calm periods, it is 
not easy in real time to distinguish between trend and cyclical movements in output, and 
this becomes even more difficult as a practical matter in emerging market economies 
where business cycles tend to be more persistent.
5  
 
The dynamic provisioning approach adopted in Spain appears to have had some success 
as it facilitates earlier detection and coverage of credit losses in loan portfolios. This 
enables banks to build up buffers against cyclical downturns, thereby increasing the 
resilience of individual banks as well as the banking system as a whole, a consideration 
that is particularly relevant for emerging market economies with bank-dominated 
financial systems.
6 The Basel Committee’s proposal of a countercyclical buffer based on 
“excess credit growth” that could reflect the buildup of system-wide risks appears 
reasonable and should alleviate some of these concerns. But it may still be subject to the 
problems of identifying simultaneous but unsustainable booms in economic activity and 
in credit aggregates. 
 
In addition to countercyclical capital requirements, a reconsideration of accounting 
standards and principles is underway to ensure that these rules do not further intensify 
systemic problems at times of crises. Mark-to-market accounting clearly did not help 
matters during the crisis when asset values were plummeting and as some assets became 
difficult to value at all when markets froze up. While a revamping of accounting concepts 
and standards may be called for, it remains important to preserve the notion of forward-
looking fair market value in developing new standards. 
  
Liquidity Risk and Leverage  
Following the crisis, these are concepts that will need to be given careful consideration in 
the regulatory process. Many of the committee reports cited earlier (fn. 1) suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                
automatically converted to equity when the system as a whole is in crisis and when the bank’s 
capital ratio falls below a predetermined threshold.  
5. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).  
6. See Saurina (2009).   8 
regulators establish parameters for financial firms to manage liquidity risk and limit 
leverage, especially as the latter can heighten counterparty risk in the financial system.  
Such policies would involve monitoring the liquidity risks of banks as well as other 
financial institutions that pose systemic risks because of their interconnectedness with 
other parts of the financial system or their size. There is a growing consensus that 
constraining leverage at both the institution-specific and aggregate levels is necessary to 
ensure that excessive leverage at either of these levels does not create systemic 
breakdowns.  
 
Regulatory oversight of payment, clearing, and settlement systems can help ensure that 
they are not subject to failure as a result of the failure of one or two institutions with large 
counterparty exposures. Central counterparty clearing of large-scale transactions, rather 
than having all settlements take place between individual firms, could add further 
stability to these systems. A potential problem is that risk could get concentrated in this 
clearing agency, which could compound problems of weak regulation and moral hazard 
problems and result in the government becoming the backstop for these risks.  
 
In assessing capital requirements on the basis of risk, it will be important to consider the 
broader relationship among credit, liquidity, and market risks. At times of crises, these 
risks can interact with and amplify each other. For instance, during the recent crisis, 
credit and market risks surged when liquidity dried up in financial markets. To deal with 
the impact of such feedback effects, capital requirements could be structured to take a 
broader view of risk and the relationships (and potential feedback mechanisms) among 
different sources of risk in the financial system. This implies that different aspects of risk 
must first be carefully considered at the level of the individual institution and then also 
analyzed at a broader systemic level. 
  
Increasing Transparency 
This is a broad concept that includes substantive issues such as bringing more derivative 
products onto exchanges where they can be traded in a more transparent setting and 
thereby can be monitored and regulated more effectively. There are risks inherent in large   9 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts that raise counterparty exposure and elevate 
the level of systemic risk. One approach to tackling this problem would be to standardize 
derivative products to the extent possible and improve the technical trading infrastructure 
in order to increase the incentives for financial firms and corporations to hedge various 
kinds of exposures on these exchanges rather than via OTC instruments. There is still a 
legitimate role for certain types of OTC products and the challenge here is to ensure that 
the regulatory net covers these products and that financial firms involved in these 
products are subject to high capital requirements. Transparency is about much more than 
reporting requirements, however. It entails a careful reconsideration of accounting 
principles and concepts to match the increasing sophistication of financial products and 
the risks embedded in them.  
 
Macroprudential Approach to Regulation 
The crisis has created a clear recognition of the need to evaluate and manage financial 
risks at the systemic level rather than at the level of individual institutions. In complex 
financial systems, where there is a high level of interconnectedness among financial 
institutions, institution-specific risk can quickly get transformed into aggregate-level risk. 
The solution is in principle to monitor institution-specific as well as aggregate risk. But a 
lot of work needs to be done on how to evaluate aggregate risk, especially in determining 
what sort of reporting requirements are needed to make proper assessments of the level of 
interconnectedness among different institutions within a system. The ultimate goal is to 
enable a systemwide approach for regulating systemically important institutions that are 
to be identified as such based on their size, extent of leverage, interconnectedness with 
other institutions, and degree to which they provide financial services critical to the 
operation of key markets.
7 
 
Coordination among Regulators  
Following from the previous point, there have been calls for closer coordination among 
different regulatory agencies and a careful analysis to close gaps that exist in the 
                                                 
7. For an Indian perspective on macro-prudential regulation and how the Reserve Bank of India 
views the challenges on this front, see Gopinath (2010).    10 
regulatory framework. Many financial institutions are now complex and operate under 
multiple jurisdictions, including in some areas where regulatory oversight might be 
minimal. There is an increasing impetus in different economies to put in place an 
institutional setup to coordinate the work of different regulatory agencies and to provide 
oversight of the agencies themselves. For instance, the U.S. Treasury has recently set up a 
Financial Services Oversight Council while the Rajan Committee made a similar 
recommendation to set up a Financial Sector Oversight Agency in India, a proposal that 
has recently been accepted by the government.
8 There are some challenges in 
determining the authority of such an institution, particularly if it is subsumed under an 
existing regulatory institution.  
 
As discussed in the context of capital requirements, it is important to ensure that tighter 
regulation in one area does not lead to regulatory arbitrage in the form of financial 
institutions shifting the regulated activity to less tightly regulated areas. The financial 
crisis has shown that operations of unregulated entities have the potential to contaminate 
markets and infect even highly regulated sectors in times of crises. Thus the systemic 
consequences of the operations of lightly regulated and unregulated entities will have to 
be taken into account as part of the process of overall regulatory coordination. 
 
There are also basic conceptual and practical questions that need to be addressed in the 
context of setting up the broad regulatory framework, including, for instance, whether it 
is appropriate for the central bank to have responsibility not just for overall financial 
stability but also for bank regulation. Even in the United States, which ostensibly had an 
efficient regulatory system, there were clearly flaws in the multiple regulator approach 
that allowed large and complex financial institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
The proposal to give the Federal Reserve Board expanded regulatory authority over large, 
systemically important (“too big to fail”) institutions met enormous resistance because of 
fears of concentration of power with the Fed and also concerns about diluting its primary 
objective of ensuring price stability. Ultimately, these are issues where general principles 
                                                 
8. For more details on the original proposals and the logic behind them, see U.S. Treasury (2009) 
and Planning Commission (2008), respectively.   11 
must be adapted to the structures, inter-relationships and institutional capacity of specific 
institutions in a particular country. 
 
Resolution Mechanisms for Failing Financial Institutions 
Massive government bailouts of distressed financial institutions were undertaken in many 
advanced economies during the throes of the crisis. This has meant that even if the 
government now exits from direct support of these institutions, the system has become 
infected with enormous moral hazard as the market will now regard every major financial 
institution as having implicit government backing. The problem of moral hazard can 
sometimes be overstated but is still an important one that will have to be dealt with 
carefully from a long-term perspective as it can create perverse incentives and stifle 
competition.  
 
One solution to this problem is to create a resolution mechanism whereby even a large 
financial institution can be allowed to fail but in an orderly manner that does not involve 
systemic spillovers of that institution’s distress. This mechanism will need to allow for 
orderly unwinding of counterparty positions, disposal of assets, and resolution of creditor 
and other claims. For this to work effectively, however, it might be necessary to impose 
capital requirements on individual units of financial conglomerates (rather than just for 
the conglomerate as a whole). 
 
There are a number of additional issues that are under active consideration as part of the 
Group of Twenty (G-20) process. These include creating adequate statutory protection for 
consumers (the U.S. Treasury has created a Consumer Financial Protection Agency), 
monitoring and evaluating the role and performance of credit rating agencies, and 
restructuring compensation schemes for investment managers in a manner that does not 
reward excessive short-term risk taking. The regulatory landscape in the advanced 
economies, including the United States, is in a state of considerable flux, with even basic 
principles still being reformulated based on lessons learned from the crisis.  
   12 
III. Regulation in Emerging Markets 
 
Along with a reconsideration of basic principles, it will be important to think about how 
to adapt these principles to the particular circumstances of emerging market economies 
where there are significant institutional and capacity constraints. Although country-
specific conditions cannot be ignored, it will still be useful to develop a framework for 
making progress on this issue. 
 
Many of the basic principles that are being formulated, including higher capital 
requirements and a focus on liquidity risk management, are as relevant for emerging 
markets as they are for advanced economies. For emerging markets, it is also a priority to 
deal with institutional and capacity constraints that limit effective regulation and hinder 
financial stability. Indeed, even basic microprudential regulation—the effective oversight 
of individual financial institutions—can be a challenge for many emerging market 
economies. From the perspectives of both individual bank efficiency and regulatory 
stability, a key priority for financial institutions in these economies is to incorporate good 
risk-evaluation and risk-management practices on their loan portfolios. 
 
Policymakers in emerging markets recognize that a core priority is to strengthen their 
institutional frameworks in order to promote financial stability. This includes instituting 
comprehensive bankruptcy procedures for corporations and financial firms, and 
developing a more robust legal framework to enforce property rights consistently and 
fairly. Unfortunately, improvements in institutions and legal frameworks are complex and 
time-consuming tasks that have economic as well as political dimensions.  
 
Whatever its benefits in terms of avoiding gaps and regulatory arbitrage, the concept of a 
single regulator may not be feasible for emerging markets and, as the U.K. experience 
shows in a different context, may not even be desirable. A more viable approach would 
be to create an oversight body that effectively coordinates the work of individual 
regulatory agencies, ensures the absence of regulatory arbitrage, prevents large gaps from   13 
opening up in the regulatory framework, and oversees the regulation of large institutions 
with operations in multiple markets.  
 
Latin American and Asian experiences show not only how valuable lessons can be 
extracted from crises but also how these lessons sometimes are forgotten over time. In the 
debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Latin American countries suffered from 
problems caused by currency mismatches between their external assets and liabilities, 
particularly in terms of having taken on large amounts of short-term debt denominated in 
foreign currency. Asian economies faced similar problems during the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–98.  
 
Major Latin American and Asian economies have withstood the recent financial crisis 
reasonably well as a consequence of having substantially reduced their foreign currency 
borrowing. By contrast, the debt-financed growth of many Eastern European economies 
left them highly vulnerable to the latest crisis.
9 Maintaining a cautious approach to 
foreign currency-denominated borrowing is clearly a safe policy but one that has to be 
balanced against the benefits to financial institutions and corporations from borrowing 
abroad. A sensible regulatory approach can be used to balance the benefits of foreign 
currency denominated debt against the attendant currency risk, with one aspect being 
careful monitoring of the level of currency risk that the financial system as a whole is 
exposed to.  
 
As noted earlier, another key constraint in emerging markets is inadequate regulatory 
capacity that cannot keep up with fast-evolving markets and products. This constraint is 
exacerbated by the challenge that competent and knowledgeable staff in regulatory 
bodies in these countries tend to be quickly absorbed by the private sector. This is one 
area where multilateral institutions can play a useful role. They can enable capacity 
building by providing training to country officials, synthesizing and transferring 
information about international best practices, and providing direct guidance in the 
formulation of codes and regulations.  
                                                 
9. See Kose and Prasad (2010).   14 
The regulatory reform agenda in emerging markets is in fact closely tied to their financial 
development agenda. Financial instability in some of these economies is less a matter of 
unfettered innovation than it is about incomplete and underdeveloped financial markets. 
This creates its own set of regulatory challenges, but it is worth turning directly to the 
relationship between two main priorities—financial development and financial 
inclusion—and see how they tie in with regulatory issues.  
 
IV. Financial Development in Emerging Markets 
 
The financial crisis makes it imperative to refine rather than retreat from the objectives 
and avenues of financial development. Mobilizing savings and effectively channeling 
them into productive investment remains a key challenge for financial systems in 
emerging markets. In economies like China and India that have high private saving rates, 
effective financial intermediation is relevant not just for promoting growth but also for 
improving the welfare impact of that growth.
10  
 
The crisis will shift the emphasis of the financial development agenda toward the basics 
of strengthening banking systems, developing plain vanilla derivative markets such as 
currency derivatives, and increasing the depth and diversity of corporate and government 
bond markets. The challenge is to create a regulatory environment that facilitates 
innovation in these areas without allowing financial innovation to get so far ahead of 
regulatory capacity that it creates systemic risks.  
 
The key priorities related to the financial development agenda in Asian emerging markets 
are summarized below. 
 
Strengthening and Improving Banking Systems 
In major Asian emerging markets, the financial systems remain largely bank dominated. 
                                                 
10. See Prasad (2009). These issues are more relevant to middle-income emerging market 
economies. Among low-income economies, the emphasis may need to be more on getting the 
basic elements of the institutional framework right, including the legal and regulatory 
frameworks, corporate governance, and accounting and auditing standards.   15 
Moreover, public sector banks (PSBs) still play a dominant role in several key Asian 
emerging markets including China and, to a lesser extent, India. Improving the efficiency 
and governance of both public and private banks is a key priority. Unfortunately, in both 
of those countries, PSBs are often seen as instruments of social policy, including 
directing credit toward favored industries. A number of other Asian countries are in a 
similar position.  
 
Interestingly, the financial crisis has cast public banks in a different light. During periods 
of extreme financial stress when the rest of the financial system is frozen up, public banks 
can serve a useful function by continuing to provide credit as they have direct 
government backing. But reforms are still necessary to ensure that these banks turn in an 
adequate performance in normal times as well. There are large but often hidden 
efficiency and welfare costs to maintaining an inefficient public banking system. While 
these banks offer a useful layer of protection during a crisis, this can be a very expensive 
form of insurance for the economy.  
 
There is no reason of course why government ownership per se should make a bank 
inefficient, although this is often the reality as political and social considerations often 
trump commercial ones. Corporatizing PSBs, which does not necessarily entail a full-
scale one-shot privatization, would be one step toward improving their performance. 
Indeed, some PSBs have increased their efficiency and, despite their social obligations, 
are able to compete with private sector banks. The State Bank of India is a good example 
of a publicly owned bank that has become highly profitable and competes effectively 
with private banks, both domestic and foreign.  
 
The priorities for strengthening banking systems in emerging markets are quite different 
from those in advanced economies. While banks in many emerging markets, including 
China and India, meet or exceed even the higher capital requirements proposed under the 
Basel III Accord, the major priority for these banks is actually to improve risk 
management rather than to strengthen their capital bases. Given the high domestic saving 
rates in these economies and the likelihood that banks will remain dominant in their   16 
financial systems for some time to come, more efficient banking systems that can do a 
better job at intermediating domestic savings into productive investment can enhance 
growth and economic welfare.  
 
Corporate Bond Markets 
Development of corporate bond markets is necessary to broaden the scope of financial 
markets in order to raise financing for large-scale enterprises. In bank-dominated 
financial systems they create a more competitive environment, inducing entrenched 
banks to increase their efficiency and direct more lending to small-scale enterprises. 
Bond markets also provide a way of disciplining firms and increasing their transparency. 
In countries like India where the needs for financing of large corporates and major 
infrastructure projects are close to exceeding the capacity of domestic banks, corporate 
bond markets can serve as an important conduit for channeling both domestic and foreign 
capital toward these needs.  
 
However, the development of well-functioning corporate bond markets is closely tied to 
the development of government bond markets since the yield curve on low-risk 
government bonds serves as a benchmark for pricing corporate risk. In China and India, 
these markets are small and underdeveloped partly because of regulatory constraints as 
well.
11 The Asian Bond Fund initiative was meant to catalyze the development of 
regional fixed-income securities markets, particularly bond markets, but has gained only 
limited traction in this dimension.  
 
Development of Basic Derivatives Markets 
Although derivatives products have acquired a negative connotation, there is a range of 
plain vanilla derivatives and securitized products that have proven to be useful 
innovations that reduce rather than raise systemic risk when properly regulated. These 
include commodity derivatives, which can play a key role in many low-income countries 
                                                 
11. Krishnan (2009) provides an interesting overview of the factors that have governed the 
development of India’s financial markets and discusses why Indian equity markets have done 
well in terms of depth and resilience while corporate bond markets and the commercial paper 
market have barely gotten off the ground.    17 
where a significant fraction of the workforce is still connected to agriculture as well as 
the extraction and processing of primary commodities. Asian countries have become 
increasingly open to trade, making it valuable for importers and exporters in these 
countries to have access to exchange rate derivatives for hedging foreign currency risk.  
 
Indeed, even during the throes of the crisis, the Asian region made progress in setting up 
some of these markets. In particular, currency derivatives markets have only recently 
been set up in both China and India; the size of these markets has expanded substantially 
over the past year, indicating the strong demand for these derivative products. Indian 
authorities have recently permitted the introduction of credit default swaps, albeit in a 
limited and carefully controlled manner. Nevertheless, this development shows that there 
is a demand for a broader range of securitization products in the large emerging markets 
and that regulators are willing to accommodate this demand as long as they are 
reasonably certain that they can maintain adequate regulatory control over such products 
so that they do not elevate the level of systemic risk.  
 
Improving Technical Infrastructure for Trading Financial Instruments 
In the large emerging markets, significant progress has been made in improving the 
technical infrastructure for trading various financial instruments, including equities, 
bonds, and derivatives. Moving more securities transactions onto open exchanges and 
creating a viable alternative for OTC transactions would increase transparency and 
efficiency in these markets. Extensive oversight of the payment, clearing, and settlement 
mechanisms will be necessary to maintain confidence in these markets, particularly to 
prevent any single financial firm from playing a dominant role, especially in relatively 
thin markets. 
 
Given these financial development priorities, the question is what the right approach 
should be to building regulatory capacity relative to fostering financial innovation and 
development. While it is tempting to put financial stability first and to focus on 
minimizing risks and potential losses, there could be costs in terms of reduced growth 
and welfare that result from underdeveloped financial markets.    18 
This points to a difficult tension that emerging markets face between tight regulation that 
limits the development of new financial markets and products, and adequate regulation 
that provides some space for financial innovation. Financial crises can have particularly 
painful effects on populations living at or near subsistence levels, so relatively poor and 
even middle-income countries might choose prudence over innovation and the risks that 
the latter entails. At the same time, holding back financial innovation and development 
has hidden but large costs if it stunts growth or makes growth less inclusive.  
 
The solution might lie in broadening the perimeter of regulation and adapting the 
evolving international principles of regulation to suit the needs of newly emerging 
financial markets and institutions. Indeed, since nonbank financial intermediaries in 
Asian emerging markets are typically smaller than those in advanced economies while 
also accounting for a relatively smaller share of the financial system, it should be easier 
for countries in the region to upgrade their regulatory frameworks to encompass all such 
institutions in a more comprehensive manner. 
 
V. Financial Inclusion 
 
Financial inclusion is a critical part of the financial development agenda for emerging 
markets. Indeed, the G-20 has highlighted the importance of the need for greater 
“financial access” in both advanced and emerging market economies. In the latter group 
of economies, a significant fraction of the population lacks access to the formal financial 
system. This affects economic growth and welfare by restricting access to credit (for 
households and entrepreneurs), making it harder to share risks and limiting diversification 
of financial savings.  
 
Regulators sometimes see broadening financial inclusion as increasing risks to the 
financial system, but, in fact, it could be a key component of increasing rather than 
diminishing financial and macroeconomic stability. Indeed, lack of adequate access to 
credit for small and medium-size enterprises as well as small-scale entrepreneurs in the   19 
services sector has adverse effects on overall employment growth since these enterprises 
tend to be much more labor intensive in their operations than large-scale industries.   
 
Financial inclusion often has been seen as a social priority that should be subsidized by 
the government. For instance, the Indian government requires banks to dedicate a certain 
proportion of their lending to “priority” sectors such as agriculture. Similarly, despite the 
purported absence of “directed lending,” Chinese banks continue to play an important 
role in providing financing to agriculture (and to large state-owned enterprises). 
Unfortunately, this makes the financial inclusion process much less effective and also 
reduces the overall efficiency of the financial system.
12  
 
A different perspective is that financial inclusion ought to be viewed not just as a social 
priority but also as one that the private financial institutions should be incentivized to 
take up (see Singh, 2010). There is a large demand for even basic financial services in the 
underserved segments of the population in many Asian countries, particularly in rural 
areas. The constraint lies in achieving scale efficiencies that make it worthwhile for the 
private sector to reach these markets. 
 
Technology can play a useful role here. Innovative approaches such as mobile banking 
(using mobile phones, which have proliferated even in rural areas in most Asian 
developing economies) could be used to increase inclusion without having to resort to 
brick-and-mortar operations. Automated teller machines (ATMs) can reduce the costs of 
setting up bank branches that may not achieve adequate scale economies to be 
individually profitable. Other approaches, like using retail grocers to provide small-scale 
retail banking services, are also being considered in many countries, including India. 
 
In some developing economies, however, such initiatives often come up against 
                                                 
12. The U.S. government’s social policy of promoting home ownership by creating government 
agencies to underwrite and broaden access to mortgages is often seen as an example of financial 
inclusion gone awry that ultimately ended in disaster. The real problem, however, was not the 
broader access per se but the tolerance of poor underwriting standards and lax regulation of the 
mortgage market. Broader financial inclusion is clearly not a substitute for effective regulation.    20 
regulatory constraints. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India has insisted that Indian 
banks must maintain the “know your customer” principle in all transactions, making it 
difficult to implement some of the approaches mentioned above. Until recently, the 
Reserve Bank also required each ATM installation to go through a cumbersome licensing 
and regulatory approval process. Such measures highlight the inherent tension that exists 
in regulators’ minds between instituting effective regulatory oversight and broadening 
financial inclusion through nontraditional means. Analytical work and field experiments 
are needed to evaluate different approaches to broadening inclusion and their 
implications for financial stability.  
 
A lot more work also needs to be done to harness the informal financial system that still 
plays an important role in low-income countries and even in some middle-income 
countries. There is a difficult set of issues about whether informal financial systems still 
have a viable and useful role, and whether they can be brought into the regulatory net in a 
manner that makes them compatible with overall financial stability. But the role of the 
informal financial sector, and the potential problems with instability associated with it, 
will tend to endogenously diminish in size as the formal financial system takes its place 
in delivering basic financial services to a broader segment of the population. Thus the 
financial inclusion agenda is not only compatible with but could also promote overall 
financial stability.  
 
VI. Macroeconomic Frameworks to Support Financial Stability 
 
The financial crisis has highlighted the intricate interplay between macroeconomic and 
financial policies at both the national and global levels. Without stable macroeconomic 
policies, financial development can be difficult. On the flip side, weakly supervised and 
inefficient financial systems can hamper the effectiveness of policy transmission 
mechanisms and make it harder to execute and manage macroeconomic policies. 
Policymakers around the world are reconsidering their approaches to monetary policy, 
capital account liberalization, and other policy frameworks in light of the crisis.  
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Monetary Policy 
Over the last two decades, many emerging markets have started adopting some form of 
inflation targeting in order to anchor monetary policy and move away from exchange rate 
targets, which have become increasingly untenable given that capital accounts are 
becoming more open.
13 A key issue is whether monetary policy should explicitly strive to 
manage asset prices. This debate has particular resonance in light of the criticism directed 
at central banks that targeted inflation either explicitly (e.g., Bank of England) or 
implicitly (e.g., the U.S. Federal Reserve) and overlooked the asset market bubbles, 
especially in the housing market, that have come back to haunt policymakers.  
 
There is a fundamental tension between increasing the mandates of the central bank and 
the independence that the central bank needs in order to adequately meet its objectives.
14 
The hierarchy of complexity related to central banking in an emerging market economy 
can be broadly characterized as follows. 
 
Attaining the basic objective of price stability is already a difficult challenge in emerging 
markets. Financial underdevelopment, weaknesses in the monetary transmission 
mechanism, and often profligate fiscal policies (creating fiscal dominance over monetary 
policy in determining aggregate price dynamics) make it difficult to consistently attain a 
low inflation objective with the interest rate instrument.  
 
Adding an exchange rate objective, which many emerging market central bankers are 
under pressure to do, makes this operationally more difficult. In principle, capital controls 
provide a degree of freedom that insulates domestic monetary policy from the stance of 
monetary policy in major partner countries. But capital accounts are becoming more open 
in virtually every country. Even in economies like China and India where there are still 
many capital controls, de facto capital account openness has increased, and it has become 
harder to limit inflows or outflows when the incentives to bring money into or take it out 
of the country are large enough.  
                                                 
13. Hammond, Kanbur, and Prasad (2009). 
14. See Prasad (2010).   22 
Furthermore, in light of the crisis, central bankers around the world are now being asked 
to pay more attention to asset price bubbles. As in advanced economies, in emerging 
markets it also is difficult to identify incipient asset price bubbles. Trying to deflate them 
once they have grown large and are more easily identifiable engenders large social and 
political costs since the collateral damage can be much greater at that point. In any event, 
the traditional monetary policy instrument—a short-term policy interest rate—may not be 
the most effective tool to deal with asset price bubbles. An alternative is to use prudential 
requirements and regulatory policies to deal with bubbles. This is a reasonable approach 
and would expand the set of instruments that central banks have. In practice, however, 
central banks have less control in certain asset markets, especially as these markets grow 
and become more sophisticated, and as foreign inflows increase in volume and in terms 
of importance to domestic markets.  
 
As discussed earlier, government ownership of banks can be very helpful in a crisis but 
creates conflict between monetary policy and regulatory objectives even in normal times. 
Interest rate changes to maintain price stability may not always be consistent with the 
stability and profitability of the banking system. This creates another layer of tension 
among a central bank’s mandates.  
 
In short, central banks in emerging markets face myriad challenges in fulfilling their 
mandates, some of which are mutually inconsistent. At the same time, in many emerging 
markets, central banks are often the public institutions with the best intellectual and 
technical capacity and robust institutional structures. So it is not surprising that they are 
asked to take on multiple mandates.  
 
Such conflicting directives can reduce a central bank’s effectiveness in meeting its core 
mandate of maintaining price stability. Indeed, it could be costly to abandon the hard-
won benefits of price stability in emerging markets. Inflation is especially pernicious in 
these economies as it hits the poor very hard, rendering low inflation a crucial objective 
of monetary policy. Inflation targeting has a good track record of delivering price   23 
stability and anchoring inflation expectations, which is very valuable in emerging 
markets, especially those with a history of high and volatile inflation.   
 
A key issue, which the crisis also has brought to the fore, is whether adding objectives to 
a central bank’s basic mandate makes it more subject to political pressures and 
interference, thereby reducing its operational independence. There are also economic 
efficiency issues to be considered carefully in this context. For instance, directing the 
central bank to focus on asset price bubbles might prevent meltdowns, but lack of a 
singular focus on price stability could create smaller boom-bust cycles if inflation 
expectations are not well anchored by a target.  
 
De Gregorio (2009) has argued forcefully that the best and only realistic approach for 
emerging market central banks is to focus on an inflation objective, using prudential 
requirements where possible to manage asset market bubbles (which are, in any case, 
difficult to identify) and letting the exchange rate serve as the adjustment mechanism. 
This approach is plausible, but it will not be straightforward to implement this in 
emerging Asia, which is highly open to trade (and therefore greatly affected by large 
exchange rate fluctuations) and where memories of the sharp exchange rate fluctuations 
during the Asian financial crisis are still raw. But it is still an important lesson to be 
learned from the experiences of Latin American economies. They were wracked by high 
inflation and crises before they moved to inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates, 
which have done much to promote macroeconomic stability in the region.  
 
Perhaps this is a trade-off to think about carefully in the context of the institutional and 
economic environment of each country, and ultimately this is a sociopolitical choice 
rather than a purely economic one. Further analysis is also needed to determine what 
additional instruments central banks will require to effectively try to satisfy multiple 
objectives and to address questions such as what sort of rule can be used to keep asset 
prices in line, especially when there is a conflict between hitting an inflation objective 
and dampening asset price bubbles. 
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Other Macroeconomic Policies 
Fiscal policy plays an important role in financial stability. Weak fiscal policies can create 
a number of distortions in the economy, especially if the scale of government borrowing 
becomes large. In the first place, it creates monetary instability by making it difficult for 
the central bank to anchor inflation expectations. If the government borrowing is done 
through banks, as is the case in India, this can have adverse effects on financial 
intermediation in the economy. Large fiscal deficits can also reduce fiscal space that is 
available for responding to financial crises or even normal business cycle downturns. 
During the global financial crisis, for instance, China was able to effectively ratchet up its 
fiscal stimulus by a large amount as it had implemented disciplined fiscal policies for 
many years, resulting in relatively low levels of explicit budget deficits and public debt.
15 
 
As discussed earlier, capital controls used to be an important part of developing country 
central bankers’ toolkits, but their effectiveness and durability has eroded significantly 
over time. Given emerging markets’ rising trade and financial integration with the global 
economy and their de facto more open capital accounts, capital controls now mostly 
generate distortions without any commensurate benefits in terms of providing adequate 
protection from volatility of capital flows or promoting stability in financial markets.  
 
VII. Cross-Border Regulation 
 
The recent financial crisis is likely to result in a moderation of cross-border capital flows 
and other aspects of financial globalization, at least in the short run while financial 
systems around the world stabilize. Nevertheless, capital accounts of emerging markets 
have become more open over time, and it is unlikely that this trend can be reversed once 
the incentives for cross-border flows return. Macroeconomic policies and financial 
regulation in emerging markets will have to deal with this reality. An important question 
is how to design policy and regulatory frameworks that can deal with complications 
                                                 
15. The level of implicit public debt in China is probably higher on account of contingent 
liabilities in the state-owned banking and pension systems. But these are not relevant in terms of 
defining short-term “policy space”--the room for expansionary fiscal policies to counter adverse 
shocks.    25 
associated with open capital accounts. It is useful first to review different factors that 
could affect the trend in emerging markets to financially integrate with the rest of the 
world. In the discussion below, I focus on the case of Asian emerging markets, but the 
general principles are relevant for all emerging markets.  
 
Possible Impact of the Crisis on Financial Flows to and from Emerging Asia 
For Asia a key aspect of greater financial integration relates to capital flows into and out 
of the region, both of which have increased sharply in recent years and have bounced 
back strongly after the crisis. 
 
1. Flows from Advanced Economies  
Capital inflows from advanced economies constitute the bulk of gross inflows into 
emerging markets, including in Asia. These flows are likely to remain at relatively low 
levels in the short term as international investors remain wary of taking on risk while the 
global economic recovery still seems fragile. On the other hand, the relatively stronger 
growth prospects of emerging markets compared to those of advanced economies should 
have a positive effect on such flows. As a reflection of international investors’ more 
favorable sentiments toward emerging markets, sovereign bond spreads for the major 
emerging markets have dropped substantially relative to their peak in November-
December 2008.  
 
An important factor that could have a longer-term effect is that many financial 
intermediaries in advanced economies (such as investment banks) that had specialized in 
investments in developing countries have been swept away by the financial crisis. This 
entails a significant loss of information about investment possibilities and financial 
markets in emerging markets, including Asia. It will take a while for this knowledge to be 
rebuilt and for new intermediaries to take on the role of channeling funds from advanced 
economies to emerging markets. Of course, emerging market economies can assist this 
process by making their financial markets more open and transparent, which would make 
it easier for foreign investors to evaluate investment possibilities and act on them. 
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2. Rising International Exposure of Asian Banks  
The size and reach of major Asian banks have continued to expand over time. They have 
large deposit bases in their home countries and are at a comparative advantage now that 
many of their international competitors have been hit hard by the crisis while Asian banks 
have remained relatively immune because of their hitherto modest international exposure. 
Many banks in the region, particularly those based in China and India, are likely to have 
increasing cross-border exposure and become true international banks. 
  
3. Asian Households’ Demand for Foreign Investments  
As income levels in the region rise, the desire for international investments, especially for 
portfolio diversification purposes, is likely to increase among Asian households and 
corporations. As financial markets in these countries become deeper and the range of 
financial intermediaries increases, the quantum of financial flows that will move into 
foreign investments is likely to increase. 
 
4. The Role of Institutional Investors  
Institutional investors based in the Asian region, including pension funds, could serve as 
an important channel for private as well as official funds to flow abroad. Sovereign 
wealth funds that manage a portion of national foreign exchange reserves are also likely 
to aggressively seek investments abroad when asset values remain relatively cheap, and 
this pattern is likely to be maintained even after global financial markets have stabilized. 
The existing stock of reserves among emerging markets in the region is large and it is 
likely that reserve accumulation will continue at a strong pace in the next few years as 
many countries in the region are likely to have ongoing trade surpluses in addition to 
capital inflows. This will increase the pool of resources that could be channeled to these 
funds. 
 
Implications for Cross-Border Regulation 
All of the factors listed above suggest that cross-border supervision will be of increasing 
interest to emerging Asia as foreign financial institutions increase their presence in the 
region and institutions from within the region increase the scale of their foreign   27 
operations. Moreover, rising trade and financial linkages amongst Asian countries imply 
that the scale of cross-border financial transactions within the region itself will increase 
rapidly. Hence, regulatory authorities in the region will face multiple challenges during 
the process of greater financial integration both within the region and with the rest of the 
global financial markets. These trends are leading to consideration of three types of 
complementary regulatory responses. 
 
1. Greater Oversight by National Regulators of the International Operations of Their 
Domestic Financial Institutions  
Cross-border operations naturally involve additional risk factors, especially exchange rate 
risk. National regulators are grappling with various dimensions of risk that arise from 
larger cross-border exposures, both from the perspective of individual institutions and 
from a systemic perspective. In extending the principle of imposing capital requirements 
on individual units of financial institutions in order to allow for orderly dissolutions of 
institutions in financial distress, one approach worth considering is to explicitly impose 
capital requirements on country-specific operations of each financial institution. This 
approach is not without its downsides, however, as it could lead to a reduction in the 
provision of financial services in countries where the retail deposit base is weak.  
 
2. Better Coordination with Regulators from Outside the Region  
The G-20 Working Group on Financial Regulation has noted that exchange of 
information with other national regulators via international colleges of supervisors can 
enhance monitoring of their domestic institutions as well as foreign institutions that have 
a substantive presence in the region. Regulatory enforcement would still be under the 
purview of national regulators but this process would improve information sharing and 
also serve as an additional channel for dissemination of regulatory best practices.  
 
3. Greater Coordination among Regulators in the Region  
This is an avenue for promoting regional financial stability. The idea mooted by the G-20 
of having colleges of supervisors that could coordinate, or at least share information, 
concerning institutions that have large cross-border operations could in principle be   28 
implemented at the regional level. There are a number of practical challenges, however, 
in terms of coordination among countries with very different levels of financial market 
development, institutional quality, and regulatory capacity. There is a logical role that 
regional multilateral institutions like the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank could play in fostering and facilitating this process. 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, institutions such as the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the Financial Stability Board are 
refashioning international regulatory norms and standards. Emerging market economies 
would ultimately benefit from the greater financial stability that will be engendered by 
the steps taken by these institutions. However, these international agencies are standard-
setting bodies that can only provide guidance on codes and international best practices. 
They are unlikely to enforce international standards or to intrude into individual 
countries’ implementation of those standards. Aligning their own regulatory frameworks 
with these new standards will be the responsibility of the individual country authorities, 
creating a complex set of challenges.  
 
VIII. Final Remarks 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the complex conceptual and practical 
challenges that emerging market economies face as they attempt to improve their 
frameworks for financial regulation. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, these 
challenges are not unique to emerging markets but are heightened by the capacity and 
institutional constraints in these economies. Emerging markets need to balance the quest 
for financial stability with the imperatives of financial development and broader financial 
inclusion. I have argued that these objectives are not necessarily inconsistent and can 
actually reinforce one another. I have also discussed aspects of macroeconomic policies 
and cross-border regulation that have implications for financial stability and the resilience 
of the financial sector in emerging markets.  
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